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Richard Rufus was an English philosopher-theologian,
the fifth Franciscan Master of Theology at Oxford.1 Like Bonaven-
ture, he was Master of Arts at Paris before joining the Franciscans
in 1238, five years before Bonaventure's entry and two years after
the celebrated theologian Alexander of Hales had joined the order,
bringing with him what became the order's first chair of theology.
Together, Alexander of Hales, Robert Grosseteste, Bonaventure, and
Richard Rufus helped make the Franciscan order a major force in the
intellectual life of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.2
1. Thomas of Eccleston Tractatus de adventu fratrum mirwrum in Anφam, ed. A.
G. Little (Manchester: University Press, 1951), p.5L
2. This paper is dedicated to the late James Weisheipl and to the late Frank
Kelley, an esteemed collaborator on the Ockham edition at the Franciscan Institute.
Fr. Weisheipl supervised Kelley's doctoral work and encouraged him to broaden his
interests to include Franciscan as well as Dominican contributions to the history of
Western philosophy. Work on this paper began in 1983 in Erfurt, East Germany, and
in West Berlin. It was supported in part by an Alexander von Humboldt Fellowship
and a grant from the American Philosophical Society. A preliminary version of this
paper was read at Kalamazoo, Michigan, at the 1989 Medieval Congress. It was
included in the sessions dedicated to James Weisheipl.
i
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Rufus's influence was chiefly felt in England during the thirteenth
century. His work emphasized Aristotelianism and logic. Rufus's en^
emy, Roger Bacon,3 testified to his influence. Bacon blamed Rufus's
"insane" views for dangerous trends in logic and theology at Oxford:
I knew the [author] of the worst and most foolish of these errors well: he
was called Richard of Cornwall. No author was accounted more famous
by the foolish multitude, but the wise considered him insane. He had
been reproved at Paris for the errors he invented [and] promulgated when
he solemnly lectured on the Sentences there, after he had lectured on the
Sentences at Oxford from the year of our Lord 1250. From that t i m e . . . to
the present. . .for forty years and more, the multitude has remained in
the errors of this master. And this boundless madness is gaining most
strength in Oxford, just as it began there.4
Clearly, Rufus's views were controversial.5 Indeed, they were censured
at least once. 6 Equally obvious is their importance for scholastic
theology. The author of the earliest surviving Franciscan Sentences -
commentary written at Oxford,7 Richard Rufus anticipates John Duns
Scotus's formidable argument for the existence of God. 8 Scotus seems
to have had Rufus's Sentences ^commentary before him when for^
mulating his own important views on the sacrament of penance.
3. Roger Bacon lectured on Aristotle from 1237 to 1247, when he left his teaching
position on the Arts faculty. Ten years later, in 1257, he joined the Franciscan order.
Bacon's second Physics -commentary seems to have been influenced by the Physics*
commentary attributed to Richard Rufus later in this paper. See the edition by F.
Delorme and R. Steele, Questiones supra Ubros octo Physicorum AristoteUs 8.2-7, Opera
Hactenus Inedita Rogeri Baconi 13 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935), pp. 377-390.
4 Roger Bacon Compendium of the Study of Theology, ed. and trans. Thomas S.
Maloney (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988), pp. 86—87. Though the translation is my own, it
is indebted to Maloney's translation and is based on his edition.
5. He was occasionally eccentric. In the course of discussing arguments for the
existence of God, he once addressed himself to the foot of a fly. Rufus Quaestio disputa
de exsistentia Dei: "Die mihi, pes muscae, numquid tu demonstras Deum esse?" See
the edition in G. Gal, "Viae ad Existentiam Dei Probandam in Doctrina R. Rufi
OFM," Franziskanische Studien 38 (1956): 177-202, at p. 201.
6. G. Gal, "Opiniones Richardi Run Cornubiensis a Censore Reprobatae," Fran*
ciscan Studies 35 (1975): 136-193.
1. D. A. Callus, "Two Early Oxford Masters on the Problem of Plurality of Forms:
Adam of Buckfield—Richard Rufus of Cornwall," Revue nέoscolastiqμe de phihsophie
42 (1939): 413.
8. Gal, "Viae ad Existentiam Dei," throughout.
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Rufίis seems also to have influenced Scotus's teaching on formal
distinctions.9
Three indisputably authentic works by Richard Rufus of Cornwall
have survived: the Paris Sentences 'Commentary (c. 1254), which is
based on St. Bonaventure's lectures of 1250-1252;10 disputed ques-
tions (dating from about 1250);11 and a commentary on the Meta-
physics written before Rufus became a friar in 1238.12 In addition,
the Oxford Sentences -commentary (c. 1252) is also almost certainly
by Rufus, as Raedts has shown,13 although its authenticity has been
questioned by Noone. Rufus's Metereolo&on appears to be lost.14 His
Physics -commentary may also be lost, although, more likely, it is
to be identified with the commentary (c. 1235) preserved in Er-
furt, Amp Ionian MS Q.312. Finally, there is some reason to believe
that Rufus wrote the very influential treatise on logic called the
Abstractiones^
My essay will consider the three early works attributed to Richard
Rufus: the Oxford Sentences -commentary, the Metaphysics -commen-
tary, and the Erfurt commentary on the Physics. Thus I shall be
9. Gal, Όpiniones Richardi Rufi," pp. 142-148.
10. Peter Raedts argues that these lectures were delivered in Oxford when Rufus
"triumphantly" returned to lecture there in 1256. The argument is based on an
added reference to Merlin and the deletion of a reference found in Bonaventure's
commentary to the practices of the Gallican church. See Peter Raedts, Richard Rufus
of Cornwall and the Tradition of Oxford Theobgy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), pp.
61-63. The suggestion that these lectures introduced Bonaventure's views to Oxford
audiences is plausible but cannot be reconciled with Bacon's statement that Rufus
lectured on the Sentences twice, first at Oxford and then "solemnly" at Paris. Also,
it would be a bit odd if four Continental manuscripts and no English manuscript
of an Oxford commentary survived. So, until more compelling evidence persuades
us to disregard Bacon's statement, I have adopted the conventional view that these
lectures were delivered in Paris.
11. Raedts, Richard Rufus, pp. 64-93.
12. See below, note 16 and related text.
13. Raedts, Richard Rufus, pp. 20-39.
14. W. Lampen, "De Fr. Richardo Rufo, Cornubiensi, OFM.," Archivum Francis*
canum Historicum 31 (1928): 403-406.
15. The identity of the author of the Abstractiones is discussed in the introduction
to the forthcoming edition of this work by Paul Streveler, Mary Sirridge, Katherine
Tachau, and Calvin Normore. They consider the attribution to Richard Rufus the
most plausible to date.
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concerned chiefly with Richard Rufus's work as a Master of Arts at
Paris. I shall discuss only one work written after Rufus became a
Franciscan and a theologian, the Sentences -commentary preserved in
Oxford, Balliol College MS 62. In his Oxford Sentences ^ commentary,
Rufus refers frequently to the arguments he had made earlier while ex-
pounding the Metaphysics. His references have confused modern schol-
ars: he refers to his own views as those of a secular master; he criticizes
his own earlier opinions. Though misleading, the references are not
incorrect, since the Metaphysics -commentary was written when Rufus
was indeed a secular master. All doubt about Rufiis's authorship of
the commentary was removed when Leonard Boyle, using ultraviolet
light, found an ascription to Rufus, in a contemporary hand, on the
first page of the thirteenth-century Vatican manuscript copy of the
work.16 The commentary is preserved in slightly different forms in
four manuscripts—Vatican, Vat. lat. MS 4538; Oxford, New College
MS 285; Erfurt, Amplonian MS Q.290; and Prague, Metropolitan
Chapter MS M.80.
The Erfurt commentary on the Physics is preserved only in Amplo
nian MS Q.312, an English codex written before 1250.17 The work
itself was written before 1235, when it was cited by Robert Grosseteste
in his notes on the Physics, in the section from book 8 which also
appears separately as De finitate motus et temporis.18 Part of the set
of early Aristotle commentaries in which a copy of Richard Rufus's
Metaphysics commentary is found, the Erfurt Physics ^ commentary is
an important help in understanding that other commentary. Robert
16. The ascription reads, "Hie incipit metaphysica magistri Richardi Rufi de
Cornub" (fol. Ira). See Timothy B. Noone, "An Edition and Study of the Saiptum
super Metaphysicam, bk. 12, dist. 2: A Work Attributed to Richard Rufίis of Cornwall"
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toronto, 1987), pp. 46 and 150.
17. Letter from Richard Rouse to the author, 8 June 1985: "Your Erfurt books. . .
would be on the early side of [the] middle of the century."
18. "1235" is the date indicated by Dales in his edition of the Physics -commentary
(see below, note 19). Dales has since suggested a date as late as 1240 for Grosseteste's
commentary on Physics 8 and De finitate, but that suggestion has not been adopted. R.
W. Southern retains the 1235 date, suggesting that the commentary on book 8 was
written between 1232 and 1235; see his Robert Grosseteste: The Growth of an English
Mind in Medieval Europe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 134. James McEvoy
provides different dates for De finitate (c. 1237) and the Physics -commentary (1228-
1232); see his Phibsophy of Robert Grosseteste (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p.
514. Thus, while there is no general agreement, no one other than Dales has accepted
thus far a date after 1235 for book 8 of the Physics -commentary.
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Grosseteste cites it as the work of a "Master Richard."19 Since Richard
Rufus is known to have written a Physics -commentary at this time,
it seems likely that he is the author of this work. Rufus's Meta-
physics-commentary includes at least three references to his Physics*
commentary.20 There are corresponding passages in the Erfurt Physics*
commentary, but none of the three references involves a verbatim
quotation and so none permits verification of the reference. Hence the
attribution of the Erfurt Physics -commentary must remain provisional.
Nevertheless, I will here adopt the hypothesis that the Erfurt Physics*
commentary is by Richard Rufus. Adopting this hypothesis will fa-
cilitate comparison between this commentary and Rufus's subsequent
commentaries on the Metaphysics and the Sentences, a comparison of
great interest for the history of the medieval reception of Aristotle.
THE DOCTRINE OF CREATION
AND THE RECEPTION OF
ARISTOTELIAN PHYSICS
The reception of Aristotle by thirteenth-century Chris-
tian philosophers provided an important stimulus to natural theology
19. The attribution is to "Magister Richardus de S. Victor." But the argument
in question is not by Richard of St. Victor (d. 1173). Since Richard of St. Victor
was not a university master, he would not be cited as "Magister Richardus." Dales
recognized the citation as a reference to a contemporary author, but he accepted
the mistaken reading "of St. Victor," commenting in a note that he could not find
the argument in Richard of St. Victor's works. See Grosseteste Cσmmentarius in VHl
libros Physicσrum AristoteUs, ed* Richard Dales (Boulder: University of Colorado Press,
1963), pp. xx, 154.
20. Richard Rufus cites his own Physics -commentary in the commentary on the
Metaphysics 1.1 by saying, "Breviter autem intelligendum est, ordine supposito in
omni genere causarum, quod sit primum et quod sit ultimum in illis. Et primo in
causis formalibus quia definibiles, tactum est super secundum physicorum" (Vatican,
Vat. lat. 4538, fol. 6vb; from an unpublished transcription by G. Gal, p. 55). Gal
cites two other references to the Physics -commentary "Commentarius in Metaphysicam
Aristotelis cod. Vat. lat. 4538, fons doctrinae Richardi Rufi," ArcHvum Franciscanum
Histcmcum 43 (1952), p. 230. "Quid autem sit primum in causis efficientibus, finalibus
et materialibus, dictum in secundo Physicorum, super capitulum de causis" (fol. 7ra).
"Ad aliud quod causa materialis <forsan pro: multitudinis> potentiarum in materia est
agens primum. . . et illud declaratum fuit diligentissime super primum Physicorum"
(fol. 13va).
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and also created difficulties in some areas. One problematic topic was
the doctrine of creation. According to Scripture, "In the beginning,
God created the heavens and the earth." Most medieval philosophers
understood this text to mean that the world began at a certain
moment of past time. By contrast, Aristotle argues that the world
never began, that no absolutely first moment of time can exist, and
hence that past time is necessarily infinite.21 Christian philosophers
in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries dealt with this conflict in
a variety of ways.
Some thirteenth' and fourteenth-century Christian philosophers
maintained that creation in time can be known only by revelation.
Latin followers of Averroes, the celebrated but heterodox Islamic
commentator on Aristotle, held that according to natural reason past
time must be beginningless and hence infinite. Others, such as St.
Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham, maintained that although
the beginning of the world in time cannot be excluded by rational
argument, neither can it be demonstrated by natural reason. Finally,
some theologians undertook to refute Aristotle, maintaining that a
temporal beginning of the world can be demonstrated by argument,
without reference to the authority of revelation. Bonaventure is per-
haps the most famous medieval Christian philosopher to argue directly
against Aristotle on this point; Richard Rufus is an earlier Franciscan
advocate of the same position.
I want to discuss Richard Rufus's arguments against the eternity
of the world. The issues surrounding creation are subtle and com-
plex. They concern the nature of time, causality, the continuum,
and the concepts of change, beginning, and ceasing. Medieval treat-
ments of these issues, moreover, are often extremely sophisticated. As
Richard Rufus developed his views, his discussion became increasingly
technical.
My discussion of Richard Rufus on creation will focus on four
problems that confront all Christian philosophers: (1) How can an
immutable God create the world without any change in God's nature?
21. But note that Aristotle himself may have held different views on this question
at different times. In the Topics, he suggests that the question whether the world is
eternal is so vast that it is difficult to argue (1.11.104bl—16). For a discussion of
Aristotle's views and the question whether Aristotle entertained the view that there
was creation in time, see Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation, and the Continuum (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 276-283.
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(2) Can reason demonstrate that the world was created from nothing,
ex nihiloΊ (3) Are there philosophically compelling arguments that
show that the world had a beginning? Can arguments for the eternity
or beginninglessness of the world be refuted? (4) Presuming that
creation can be rationally demonstrated, what account should we give
of the beginning of time and motion? In dealing with these topics, I
shall take up Rufus's attitude toward Aristotle.
THE PHYSICS-COMMENTARY (C. 1235)
MUTABILITY AND CREATION
In the Physics -commentary, Rufus's approach to the
problem of how an immutable God could create the world is quite
traditional. His discussion is influenced by Boethius. Rufus states the
problem as follows: A creator cannot be immutable; the creator's
disposition must change. As a creator, God must have a disposition
toward the world that God did not have before the world came into
existence. In his resolution of this problem, Rufus affirms that God's
will remains always unchanged. Since God is entirely simple, prior
and posterior have no part in God's nature. God's creation of the
world is not temporally prior to creatures; it owes its priority to the
simplicity of God's nature.22
TIME AND ETERNITY
In what sense is God prior to creatures? Rufus describes
God as an indivisible (aliquod indivisibile). Hence the world is like a
22. Rufus (?) In Physic. Aristot. 8.1-2: "Si ponamus mundum esse creatum, tune
videtur quod creator unde creans aliquam habuit dispositionem quam non habuit
prius, cum non creavit. Et potest responded quod non sequitur, 'quia ab aeterno
voluit creare in a c, ab aeterno voluit creare in alio\ Et sic licet creavit <!> i n α c ,
nulla facta est mutatio in eius voluntate, sed semper vult quod voluit et non vult quod
noluit. Vel possumus dicere aliter quod haec ratio supponit falsum, cum ponat prius
ante creationem mundi, prius dico duratione. Et hoc dicit Boethius quod creare non
est prius creaturis temporis antiquitate sed simplicitate naturae, quia ipse [creator]
cum sit simplicissimus, in eius esse non cadit prius et posterius" (Erfurt, Amplon.
312, fol. llvb).
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line flowing from an indivisible point.23 The point remains, and the
line flows. Within the point is neither before nor after, and yet the
point itself is prior to the line and all of its parts. Before creation,
the world exists with God; its (physical) nonexistence is its existence
with God. The nonexistence of the world is not temporally prior to
its existence. There is neither before nor after in its nonexistence,
and no first moment of the world's existence.2^
The concept of an eternal instant, called the 'now of eternity', plays
a crucial role in Rufus's account of God's priority to the world. Rufus
contrasts the now of eternity with temporal instants that measure mu-
table beings. Unlike temporal nows, the now of eternity is not the end
of a past and the beginning of a future. The now of eternity does not
limit the past and the future, and hence Aristotle was mistaken when
he claimed that every now is a division between two periods of time.25
The now of eternity pertains to what is unchanging, to the first
being and to being as such. There is no succession in immutable
23. Galfridus de Aspall espoused similar views in his Metaphysics -commentary:
"Concluditur enim ibi [VIII Physic] quod est unum primum movens, indivisibile
etc." See G. Gal, "Robert Kilwardby's Questions on the Metaphysics and Physics of
Aristotle," Franciscan Studies 14 (1954): 21; and Charles Lohr, "Medieval Latin Aris-
totle Commentaries," Traditio 24 (1968): 150-152. Compare William of Auvergne
De universo 1.2.1: "ipse creator benedictus est simplex et impartibilis, et tamen est
infinitus et immensus amplitudine sua" (ed. Paris, 1674), 1:683.
24. Rufus (?) In Physic. Aristot. 8.1-2: "Et potest responded ita et dicere quod
non-esse mundi fuit prius quam esse mundi uno modo, et tamen in ipso non-esse
non cadebat prius et posterius. Et hoc sic possumus intelligere: non-esse creaturae
non est nisi sola exsistentia eius apud Creatorem. Exitus ergo de non-esse in esse est
fluxus eius a Creatore. Intelligamus ergo Creatorem ut aliquod indivisibile ut punctum
quoad hoc, et esse creaturae tamquam lineam fluentem ex puncto. Et intelligamus
punctum sicut manens et totam lineam sicut fluentem, adhuc erit dicere quod in
ipso puncto non cadit prius neque posterius, et tamen ipse punctus est prius quam
ipsa linea vel aliquod ipsius. Et hoc modo est dicere quod non-esse mundi est prius
quam suum esse, et tamen in suo non-esse non cadit neque prius neque posterius....
/12ra/ [I]ntelligamus ens primum ut indivisibile et esse temporalium ut quidam fluxum
ab ipso. Unde apparet quod ipse fluxus [est] ab alio, et tamen in ipso non est dicere
primum. Sic est in creatione mundi vel motus, quod illud a quo est ille fluxus est sicut
quoddam indivisibile, et in esse ipsorum non est dicere primum" (Erfurt, Amplon.
312, fols. llvb, 12ra).
25. Rufus (?) in Physic. Aristot. 8.1—2: "Et possumus respondere sicut communiter
respondetur <respondet E >, ut dicamus quod haec est falsa Όmne mine est medium
duorum temporum.' Sed contra ilia supponimus ex quarto libro quod tota substantia
temporis est unum nunc manens secundum substantiam. Et hoc nunc secundum quod
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substances, no before and after. Like the beings it pertains to, the
now of eternity is incorruptible and unfailing. Even mutable entities,
insofar as they have being, belong to the now of eternity. For being
mutable does not alter being itself, does not add a new nature. Being
as such—the being that is common to both mutable and immutable
beings—pertains to the now of eternity.26
It is the now of eternity that is (nontemporally) prior to creation.
The now of eternity does not limit periods of time; it is (nontempo-
rally) prior to time as a whole. The now of eternity measures created
eternity, aeviternity. Aeviternal beings—such as angels or celestial
bodies—are created by God in eternal and immutable existence. Un-
like God, they have duration, but not the mutable duration measured
by time. Since the nonbeing of the world pertains to the now of
eternity, the nonbeing of the world has no temporal dimension.
CREATION DEMONSTRATED
Given this picture of time and creation, Rufίis seeks to
prove that the world began. He demonstrates creation by proving that
time and the world cannot be beginningless or eternal. Six arguments
adhaeret toti transmutation! est tempus, et secundum quod adhaeret mutato quod est
indivisibile in toto motu, sic est nunc temporis" (Erfurt, Amplon. 312, fol. 12ra).
26. Rufus (?) In Physic. Aristot. 4-10: "Ad intelligendum quomodo nunc manet
idem in tempore, mihi videtur quod oportet incipere a nunc aetemitatis, ut ante
intelligamus nunc aetemitatis intelligamus substantiam intransmutabilem sicut in-
telligentiam. . . . Et talis est duratio substantiae intransmutabilis sicut intelligen-
tiae, quia eo quod intransmutabilis est, nihil in tali substantia succedit a l t e r i . . . .
Praeterea, nihil ibi prius et posterius.... Sic cum hoc intelligamus quod sicut ipsa
intelligentia est incorruptibilis et indeficiens et similiter suum esse, quod similiter
sua duratio sit indefΐciens et incorruptibilis.// Et sic intelligimus nunc aetemitatis; et
loquor de aeternitate creata. Sic enim intelligamus unam durationem indefΐcientem
sine priori et posteriori....// Ulterius intelligendum quod esse mutabile non addit
novam naturam super esse simpliciter.... Sicut ergo ipsum nunc aetemitatis debetur
enti intransmutabili, similiter debetur omni enti in quantum esse habet. Sed in hoc est
differentia, quod enti intransmutabili debetur indeficienter et ut aeternitas est. Enti
tamen universaliter habenti esse debetur abstrahendo ab his difϊerentiis 'defΐcientis,'
'indefΐcientis,' et sic habemus quod omni enti in quantum esse habet debetur ipsum
n u n c . . . . /8rb/ [Q]uaero de nunc corruptibili, utrum sit corruptibile in se vel in alio.
Dicitur forte quod ipsum nunc consideratum in tali ratione in quantum adhaeret
mobile hoc corruptibile est, sed illo eodem considerato secundum sui substantiam
manet et incorruptibile est" (Erfurt, Amplon. 312, fol. 8ra, 8rb).
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are advanced against beginningless time. The strongest is based on
the nature of the past. Whatever has been traversed or completed
cannot be infinite. But "having been traversed" pertains to the nature
(ratio) of the past. Therefore, what is past cannot be infinite.2?
In the later version of this argument presented in his Oxford
Sentences -commentary, Rufus seeks to strengthen the controversial
premise, "to have been traversed pertains to the nature of the past."28
Rufus claims that "whatever is past was present," and concludes that
"time past is finite." The text of this argument is garbled as it stands.
But Rufus's intention is clear. He wants to demonstrate what he
takes to be an unacceptable consequence of the view that past time
is infinite. If past time is infinite, then some past time was never
present. However far we go back in time, we can never go far enough
that all of the past will have been present, since there is no all of
the past. In what sense is time past, if it was never present? Later
medieval Scholastics expounding the term 'past* might argue that the
past 'was, but is not now, present'. The infinitist cannot employ this
exposition. Instead he or she must accept the consequence, 'some past
days are not now and never were present'.
In modern philosophy, the argument that past time must be fi-
nite is attributed to Kant, who advanced it as the First Antinomy
of Pure Reason. This argument had earlier been advanced in late
antiquity by the brilliant, but heterodox, Greek Christian philoso-
pher, Philoponus.29 Philoponus's argument was known to Arabic and
27. Rufus (?) in Physic. Aristot. 8.1-2: "Item, contra rationem infiniti est esse
pertransitum, ut patet in capitulo de infinito. Sed de ratione praeteriti est esse
pertransitum. Ergo contra rationem infiniti est esse praeteritum" (Erfurt, Amplon.
312, fol. 12ra). This argument is cited by Grosseteste as an argument by "Magister
Richardus" in Commentarius in Phys., ed. Dales, p. 154. The manuscript mistakenly
identifies this "master" as Richard of St. Victor. The Victorines were not university
masters, and Richard of St. Victor did not make such an argument. Dales has since
concluded that probably the reference is to Richard Rufίis, though he doubts whether
this portion of the work was really written by Grosseteste (letter from Dales to the
author, 30 June 1989).
28. Quoted below, in the third section. See note 69 and related text.
29. Did Richard Rufus know Philoponus? Yes. Indeed, Rufus cites him as "Ioannes
Grammaticus." But he knows only the arguments mentioned by Averroes. He quotes
Philoponus approvingly and knows that Philoponus held that the world was cor-
ruptible since its power is finite. See Rufus in Metaph. Aristot. 12.7-8.1, ed. Noone,
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Hebrew thinkers.30 Whether and how it was transmitted to the Latin
West is not clear.31 The argument first appeared among the Latins
around 1223, in William of Auvergne's De Trinitate.^
As presented by Richard Rufus, this argument differs somewhat
from the one originally presented by Philoponus and repeated by
authors like Maimonides. The original argument stresses the claim
that successive synthesis cannot produce an infinite series; the infinite
set discussed is the souls of the departed: if the world had existed from
eternity, the number of the souls of the departed would constitute an
actual and countable infinity, which is impossible. A further claim is
p. 234. But Averroes does not cite Philoponus's argument against the eternity of past
time. This argument was stated in Philoponus's Physics -commentary, and repeated in
his Meteσrology -commentary. A more complete statement of this argument is from
Philoponus's De aetemitate mundi contra Proclum, dated 529. His Contra Aristoteϊem
also includes the argument. See Sorabji, Time, Creation, and the Continuum, p. 198.
None of these works was available to Richard Rufus. Only Philoponus's De anima
was translated into Latin before the Renaissance. Hence most medievalists agree with
Anneliese Maier that Philoponus had no direct influence on Latin Scholasticism; see
her Zwei Grundprobleme der scholastischen Naturphilosophie, 2nd ed. (Rome: Storia e
letteratura, 1968), p. 127. Nonetheless, the similarities between Philoponus's views
and some important developments in scholastic natural philosophy continue to raise
questions. Fritz Zimmermann points to Philoponus's popularity among Arabic and
Hebrew thinkers as evidence that indirect influence was possible; see his "Philoponus'
Impetus Theory in the Arabic Tradition," in Philoponus, ed. Richard Sorabji (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 121, 128-129. For a discussion of Philoponus's
views, see Sorabji, Time, Creation, and the Continuum, especially pp. 193—231.
30. H. Davidson, "John Philoponus as a Source of Medieval Islamic and Jewish
Proofs of Creation," Journal of the American Oriental Society 89 (1969): 376-377.
31. No Arabic or Hebrew version of this argument appears to have been available
in early thirteenth-century Paris. Maimonides' citations of Philoponus in the Guide
to the Perplexed (available in Latin about 1225) make no reference to the claim that
the past is by definition completed, traversed, or "exhausted" (to use Nazzam's term).
Al-Ghazzali clearly knew the argument, but his work was first translated into Latin
in 1328. For al-Ghazzali, see also below, the notes (38 and 39) on the following
argument.
32. William of Auvergne De Trinitate 10, ed. B. Switalski (Toronto: PIMS, 1976),
pp. 68-69.1 owe this reference to Neil Lewis. William wrote not much before Rufus.
De Trinitate is the first part of William's Magisterium Divinale, composed between
1220 and 1236. Some, if not all, of the Magisterium was written after 1228, when
William became bishop of Paris. Kramp's claim that parts were written before 1228
is open to question. For example, Kramp reasons that a bishop would not have used
examples in which someone suggests that an unworthy candidate had been elevated
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based on the assumption that the infinitist is committed to the view
that there was a first person. The argument correctly claims that if
there were a first past person followed by an infinite series of people,
the series would not reach the present generation.
By contrast, the argument presented by Richard Rufiis, William
of Auvergne, and some Arabic authors is based on the claim that
being traversed or completed is intrinsic to the nature of the past.
Some modern cosmologists—such as G.J. Whitrow—consider it the
strongest argument against the beginninglessness of the world's ex^
istence.33 Related arguments have been presented by William Lane
Craig and Pamela Huby.^4
The next argument that I shall present was also first advanced by
the Greek Philoponus, was recovered for the Latin West by William
of Auvergne,35 and was widely known among Islamic and Jewish
authors.36 Rufus's version is based on our concept of priority. If the
number of days before today is infinite, and the number of days
before tomorrow is infinite, then the number of days before today
to the episcopacy. Hence it is possible, though exceedingly unlikely, that William
formulated this argument at about the same time as the Erfurt Physics -commentary
was written, and in similar circumstances. See I. Kramp, "Des Wilhelm von Auvergne
'Magisterium divinale,'" Gregσrianum 2 (1921): 54-78. Other Latin versions of this
argument—by Thomas of York, John Peckham, and Richard of Middleton—postdate
the Erfurt Physics -commentary that I want to attribute to Richard Rufus. Dales has
suggested in personal correspondence that Rufus may have been anticipated by an
anonymous Latin author in Vat. lat. 185 (letter from Dales to the author, 11 August
1989; see also Dales, Medieval Discussions of the Eternity of the World ([Leiden: E. J.
Brill, 1990], p. 80). The author of this two page gloss on Genesis 1:1, written in
or before 1250, was a contemporary of Richard Rufus. Bonaventure's version of the
argument against the infinity of the world, like Maimonides', makes no reference to
the claim that past time is necessarily completed or traversed; see Bonaventure in
Sent. 2.1.1.1.2, as in Opera Omnia 2 (Quaracchi: CSB, 1885), pp. 19-24.
33. G. J. Whitrow, "On the Impossibility of an Infinite Past," British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science 29 (1978): 39-45; Norman Kretzmann, Όckham and the
Creation of the Beginningless World," Franciscan Studies 45 (1985): 14.
34. The arguments of modern advocates of this position are discussed by Sorabji
in Time, Creation, and the Continuum, pp. 219-224, 445.
35. Contra Aristotelem de aeternitate mundi, as cited by Simplicius, in Phys. Aristot.,
ed. H. Diels, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graecem 10 (Berlin, 1895), p. 1179; trans.
C. Wildberg, Against Aristotle (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 145-146.
William's argument is quoted below.
36. H. Davidson, "John Philoponus as a Source," pp. 376-377.
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is not less than the number of days before tomorrow. Consequently,
today does not arrive sooner than tomorrow, which is absurd. Rufus
assumes here that unequal infinities are impossible. Since the end of
the nineteenth century, philosophers and mathematicians, following
Georg Cantor, have rejected this assumption, arguing that unequal
infinities are possible. But Rufus's argument need not be affected by
this change of view. If we postulate beginningless time, the number
of days before today and the number of days before tomorrow are
mappable infinite series and hence equal, not unequal, infinities. Rufiis
might still argue that if the world has no beginning, then we must
give up the belief that less time transpires before earlier events than
before later events.37
The version of this argument found in the works of Philoponus,
al-Ghazzali, and William of Auvergne differs slightly.38 These authors
assume that more time transpires before later events than before
earlier events. As they present the argument, the absurd conclusion
to be rejected is that it is possible to add to an infinity, or that one
infinity can be multiplied by another, so that one infinity would be
greater than another by a determinate proportion. By contrast, the
absurdity Rufus asks us to reject is that Today does not come sooner
than tomorrow1.39
37. Rufus (?) in Physic. Aristot. 8.1-2: "Item, si esset tempus praeteritum infinitum
ex parte ante, tune numerus dierum usque ad diem istum esset ab unitate in infinitum.
Iterum, numerus dierum usque eras esset ab unitate in infinitum. Sed talis numerus
non est unus numerus maior alio nee minor, et sic non sunt pauciores dies usque ad
diem ilium quam usque ad diem crastinum, nee minus tempus. Et tune non citius
veniret ista dies quam crastina. Priori enim res, brevius tempus" (Erfurt, Amplon.
312, fol. 12ra).
38. Averroes Destxucύo Destructionum Philosophiae AlgazeUs, ed. Beatrice Zedler
(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1961), p. 78. William of Auvergne De
universe* 1.2.1: "Eodem modo est considerare de revolutionibus Saturni, quae sunt
ad revoiutiones solis in proportione unius ad trigenta. Similiter et de revolutionibus
J o v i s . . . in proportione unius ad duodec im. . . . Impossibile autem est infinitum esse,
cujus partes certae comparationis, et proportionis ad ipsum inveniuntur, etc." (Paris
ed. 1:688).
39. Richard Rufus almost certainly knew William of Auvergne. Whether Rufus
had indirect access to Philoponus's version of this argument is uncertain. The current
scholarship suggests that he did not. The most likely point of contact is in the
works al-Ghazzali. Al-Ghazzali employed this argument in his refutation of Avicenna's
views, The Destruction of the Philosophers, the second part of his Deliverance from Error.
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Many of Rufus's other arguments employ Aristotelian premises to
argue against Aristotelian conclusions. Rufus argues that Aristotle's
belief in a first efficient cause commits him to the view that the world
has a beginning.40 If the time between nonbeing and now is infinite,
then the number of intermediate causes between the first cause and
the final effect is infinite, and there is no first mover. Rufίis concludes
that if Aristotle maintains that there is a first efficient cause, he must
suppose that everything else has a beginning.
Rufiis also adduces against Aristotle his statement that the infinite
has no relation {ordinatio) to the finite. If past time is infinite, it has no
relation to the finite, nor to this day. But in fact the past is related to
today; therefore it is not infinite.41 This was not simply an ad hominem
argument. Rufus accepted the principle that infinite and finite cannot
be ordered to each other. For this reason Rufiis argues that an infinite
God does not directly move the heavens. As an efficient cause, God
acts mediately, by means of the Intelligences. If the heavens were
moved directly by God's infinite power, they would move infinitely
fast, and their motion would be instantaneous, not in time.42
The Destruction became available when Averroes' attack on it, the Destruction of the
Destruction, was translated into Latin in 1328. Before 1328, however, most Latins
knew only the first part of the Deliverance, a summary of Avicenna's views.
40. Rufus (?) in Physic. Aristot. 8.1—2: "Item, bene sumit Aristoteles quod primum
fuit causa efficiens omnium, ergo educens de non-esse in e s se . . . . Dicere ergo quod
illud non-esse per infinitum tempus distat ab hoc nunc, est dicere quod positis
extremis infinita sunt media [ut dicit] Aristoteles in lib. Posteriorum. Sic ergo videtur
quod si ponat Aristoteles primum esse efficientem causam, quod ponat omnia alia
incepisse" (Erfurt, Amplon. 312, fol. 12ra—12rb).
41. Rufus (?) in Physic. Aristot. 8.1-2: "Dicit [Aristot.] quod infinitum non habet
ordinationem ad finitatem. Ex quo sequitur quod si tempus praeteritum est infini-
tum, non habebit ordinationem ad finitatem, ergo nee ad diem istum; sed habet
ordinationem; ergo non est infinitum" (Erfurt, Amplon. 312, fol. 12ra).
42. Rufus (?) in Physic. Aήstot. 8.10: "Praeterea, dicendum sicut dicit Commenta-
tor, quod oportet ibi esse duplicem motorem sicut intelligentiam creatam et primam
causam. Quia enim motus est in tempore infinito, oportet ibi esse infinitam potentiam.
Et quia non in instanti et similiter quia est ibi proportio motoris ad mobile, oportet ibi
esse motorem finitae potentiae, ut dicamus quod potentia creata intelligens primum et
informata per ipsum moveat, et ipsa sic considerata quodammodo est finitae potentiae,
quodammodo infinitae. Et per hoc quod est ibi de potentia infinita, movet in tempore
infinito, sed tamen quia ilia potentia infinita movens mediante potentia finita, erit
iste motus secundum possibilitatem potentiae finitae, et sic in tempore et non in
instanti" (Erfurt, Amplon. 312, fol. 13vb).
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Though he frequently argues against Aristotle, Rufus's attitude
toward Aristotle and Aristotelian philosophy is very positive in the
Physics -commentary. Rufus not only believes that reason makes ev-
ident that the world began in time, he also believes that many of
the necessary arguments can be drawn from Aristotle's own works. In
the Physics -commentary, Rufus even claims that it would be wrong
to conclude that Aristotle held that the world is beginningless or
eternal.43 Rufus concedes only that perhaps Aristotle did believe that
time is infinite. Aristotle may have been persuaded by Plato's authority
to hold that the world was eternal a pane post—that is, having once
begun, the world never ends. If so, Aristotle can be excused, for
Plato's authority was linked to a good argument—namely, that willing
destruction does not pertain to God. Pagan philosophers could be
excused for believing that the world would not come to an end.44
CREATION EX NIHILO
Rufus even defends Aristotle's statement that the world
was not created. Aristotle was arguing against Plato, who believed
that the world was created from something preexisting, something
with duration. According to Rufus, both Aristotle and Plato assumed
that the statement The world was not created' was equivalent to the
statement The world was not created from something preexisting'.
Plato was mistaken to believe that before the world existed, something
with the potential to become the world existed. In fact, the world was
created from nothing, ex nihilo, as Scripture makes plain. Correctly
interpreted, Aristotle was denying only that before the world existed
there was a preexisting potential world, that the nonexistence of the
world had duration, and that it was measured by some 'quasi-temporal'
dimension. Aristotle was not arguing against the Christian view of
43. Rufus (?) In Physic. Aristot. 8.1-2: "Quia imponitur Aristoteli quod ipse
intellexit mundum non incepisse, cuius oppositum apparet ex sua recapitulatione,
videtur quod possumus concludere ex dictis Aristoteleis quod mundus incepit" (Erfurt,
Amplon. 312, fol. 12ra).
44. Rufus (?) in Physic. Aristot. 6.1: "His et multis aliis rationibus contingit arguere
ex dictis Aristotelis et per rationes physicas mundum incepisse. Sed forte crediderit
mundum non habere finem iuxta illam auctoritatem Platonis: bona ratione coniunc-
tum dissolvi velle non est Dei. Crediderunt enim mundum esse factum in optima
dispositione, sed nos per fidem et vere credimus oppositum sicut resurrectionem et
meliorem mundi dispositίonem" (Erfurt, Amplon. 312, fol. 12rb).
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creation—namely, that the world was created, and before creation
nothing with the potential to become the world existed.^5
Rufus's positive attitude toward Aristotle at this point in his career
shows the influence of Alexander of Hales, whom Rufus knew at Paris
before he joined the Franciscan order.46 Alexander of Hales believed
that there was no great danger in Aristotle's teaching. Aristotle and
the ancient philosophers did not know about creation, which is above
nature. But as far as their work went, ancient philosophers were
correct. The world's existence and its motion are commensurate with
the whole duration of time.^7
THE METAPHYSICS-COMMENTARY
(BEFORE 1238)
The picture presented in Richard Rufus's Metaphysics -
commentary is similar in many respects to that of the Physics -
45. Rufiis (?) in Physic. Aristot. 8.1-2: "Procedit enim ex suppositione huius
'si mobile est factum, hoc erat <er' E> per motum'. Et hoc non est verum nisi
intelligamus factum ex aliquo praeiacente quod praeiacens erat in quiete et tempore
praeiacente.. . . Sed tune videtur peccare ratio Aristotelis quae dicit prius non-
esse sine tempore, et sic non-esse mundi vel motus non praecedit esse. Si enim
praecederet, tempus praecederet, et sic motus. Et possumus dicere quod ipse non
sic intellexit, sed intendit ostendere quod non-esse non potest esse prius hoc /12ra/
modo ut in ipso non-esse cadit prius et posterius. Et ita posuerunt philosophi cum
posuerunt mundum fieri ex aliquo praeiacente et non ex nihilo. Ipsi enim posuerunt
non-esse mundi et motus cum quadam duratione.. . . Et debemus intelligere quod
ipse [Aristoteles] non intendit quin tempus processit ex non-esse in esse. Sed hunc
modum intendebat improbare eis ut eius non-esse esset cum dimensione aliqua et
duratione. Et sic intellexit Platonem ponere, ut scilicet poneret non-esse mundi esse
cum aliquo quod esset in potentia mundus. Sed durationem huius non vocavit plus
tempus, quia non fuit motus. Posuit ergo [Plato] tempus processisse ex non-esse in
esse, quod non-esse fuit divisibile. Et si esset divisibile, tune possemus sumere primum
instans in esse temporis . . . . Hoc ergo modo intelligamus et procedit ratio Aristotelis,
nee concludit inconveniens, scilicet quod tempus non processit sic de non esse in
esse, sed quod non-esse duraret per aliquam dimensionem ante eius esse" (Erfurt,
Amplon. 312, fol. llvb-12ra).
46. Rufus's many citations of Alexander of Hales's Glossa, an early work, are
reported in the index of the 1951-1957 Quaracchi edition of Alexander.
47. Alexander of Hales De materia pήmay in an unpublished translation by Richard
C. Dales based on Paris, Bibl. nat. MSS lat. 15272 and 16406, and Bologna, Bibl.
univ. MS 2554.
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commentary. The first cause is an indivisible of infinite power."*8 As in
the Physics -commentary, Rufiis states that the heavens do not move
in virtue of an intrinsic principle; they must be moved by an extrinsic
principle—that is, the first principle, God. But God does not move
the heavens directly, only mediately. The reasons adduced for this
conclusion are substantially the same as those offered in the Physics ~
commentary—namely, that the heavens would move infinitely fast if
moved directly by an infinitely powerful principle of motion.49
The accounts in the commentaries on both the Physics and the
Metaphysics indicate that the being and nonbeing of the world are
not temporally ordered. There was no time before the world was
created.50 The now of eternity is an important explanatory concept
in both works.51 Not every now is the beginning of a future and the
end of a past.52
But in some respects the picture has changed. Rufiis's attitude
toward Aristotle is much less positive; there is no defense of Aristotle
on creation. Rufus's account of the beginning of time and motion has
changed, and his defense of the view that creation does not imply
48. Rufus In Metaph. Aristot. la.l: "Et est illud indivisibile prima causa" (Vatican,
Vat. lat. 4538; unpublished transcription by Gal, p. 14). 12.6: "[I]ntelligamus modo
causam primam [esse in] indivisibili nunc aeternitatis." 12.7-8: "In speciali. . . declaiv
atum est quod una substantia separata a materia aeterna [est]. De ilia eadem declara-
turn est in fine octavi Physicorum quod nullam habet magnitudinem neque divi-
sionem" (ed. Noone, pp. 186, 231-232).
49. in Metaph. Aristot. 12.8.6.4-5: "prima autem causa est motor remotus et non
immediatus. Nam si sic, cum prima causa infinitam potentiam habeat, moveretur
caelum in non tempore . . . . Prima causa nullo modo est sub tempore. . . oportet
quod sit aliquid medium quod sit motor immediatus... . [D]e necessitate oportet
quod sit intellectus movens caelum et non forma eius sic. Illud mobile per suum
motum est causa cuiuslibet viventis in natura: vita vegetativa et sensitiva. Sed
quidquid facit mobile, hoc facit per suum motorem. Motor enim est causa motus.
Ergo motor est causa vitae. Oportet igitur quod sit res vivens" (ed. Noone, pp.
270-274). Rufus (?) In Physic. Aristot. 6.10 (Erfurt, Amplon. 312, fol. 13vb), as
quoted above.
50. In Metaph. Aristot. 12.6.1.3-4: "esse et non-esse prout sunt termini creationis
non distinguuntur tempore. Unde, etsi non*ese in creatione sit prius esse, cum [tamen]
illud 'prius' non sit prius tempore sed natura solum, non sequitur quod tempus sit
ante mundi generationem <itapro: creationem>" (ed.Noone, p. 191).
51. in Metaph. Aristot. 12.6.1.3-4: "intelligamus modo causam primam [esse]
indivisibili nunc aeternitatis." Compare 12.8-9.7.12 (ed. Noone, pp. 186, 317f.).
52. in Metaph. Aristot. 12.6.1.3-4: "Et ideo supposuit Aristoteles falsum quodlibet
instans esse principium futuri et finis praeteriti" (ed. Noone, p. 186).
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mutability in God is more elaborate and relies less on the traditional
Boethian account.
THE BEGINNING OF TIME
Rufus abandons the quasi-Aristotelian position of the
Physics -commentary that time has no intrinsic limit, only an extrinsic
limit that is God's atemporal mode of being. Rufus no longer describes
creation as flowing from the indivisible extrinsic limit, which is the
creator. Instead, in the Metaphysics -commentary, Rufus allows that
time has an intrinsic limit, that there is a first instant of time. God
created the world ex nihilo at the first instant of time. Rufus dissociates
himself from his former views by saying,
Others wish to save Aristotle in another way. A line has an intrinsic
beginning [principium]—namely, a point. But motion has an extrinsic, not
an intrinsic, limit. And this is what Aristotle intended to say when he said
that there is no first motion. For in motion there is nothing except having
been moved or instants of motion [motum esse]. This reply is worthless,
for Aristotle intends that time is infinite, and motion is infinite; <time>
does not have any intrinsic beginning [principium}. For <every> now is
the beginning of a future and the end of a past. According to Aristotle,
an instant cannot be the beginning of time, so that before that instant
there would be no other time. Hence he supposes that time has no end
and no beginning, and neither does motion.53
Quite correctly, Rufus now sees that according to Aristotle's ac-
count, time has no beginning. All of time can have no limit, either
intrinsic or extrinsic. On the Aristotelian account, an instant at the
beginning of all time, or an intrinsic limit for time, before which there
would be no time, is impossible.
53. In Metaph. Aristot. 12.1.2: "Alii volunt alio modo salvare ipsum sic. Linea
habet principium intrinsecum sui, scilicet punctum. Motus autem habet principium
extra se sed non intra, et hoc intendit Aristotles cum dicit quod non est motus primus.
In motu enim nihil est nisi motum esse. Et illud nihil est, Aristoteles enim vult quod
tempus sit infinitum et motus infΐnitus, et non habet principium intrinsecum aliquod.
Quia nunc est principium futuri et finis praeteriti, et secundum ipsum instans non
potest esse principium temporis, ita quod ante ipsum instans non sit aliud tempus.
Unde ponΐt tempus non habere finem nee principium nee similiter motum" (ed.
Noone, p. 181).
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Rufus is no longer content to explain that Aristotle is fundamen*
tally opposed only to the view that creation is a departure from an
immediately previous state, not to theories of creation ex nihilo. Rufus
has read a number of Robert Grosseteste's works, including De libero
arbitrio, HexaZmeron, De cessatione legalium, De motu supercaelestium,
and De scientia Dei.5^ Grosseteste has convinced him that Aristotle
really is opposed to the Christian account of creation; Aristotle cannot
be excused* Rufus had always known that Aristotle claimed that every
now is intermediate between a past and a future, but before reading
Grosseteste he did not see this as a false imagination, the product
of a clouded intellect. Grosseteste's views were in marked contrast
to the optimistic tradition of Alexander of Hales, who indicated that
pagan philosophers reasoned correctly in a limited sphere. Grosseteste
taught, rather, that the errors of the philosophers were a necessary
result of the bondage of their affections; so attached to transitory
things, pagan philosophers could not attain an understanding of the
simplicity of eternity.55
REFUTING THE ARGUMENT
AGAINST EX NIHILO CREATION
In the Metaphysics ^ commentary Rufus offers no argu-
ments which show that the claim that the world is beginningless
leads to absurd conclusions. Instead he seeks to defend the doctrine
of creation ex nihilo against Aristotelian attacks. Aristotle claims that
there can be no change where there is no previous state. And Rufus
fears that Aristotle may be right. "But now it seems that Aristotle
spoke the truth. For since motion is not coeternal with God,. . . the
mover was not always in act. Therefore it was previously something
moving in potentia and thereafter in act. Therefore it was changed
from this disposition to that disposition."56 Rufus also states the
54. Noone, "An Edition," p. 58.
55. Grosseteste De finitate, ed. Dales, pp. 261-264. Compare Grosseteste Com. in
Vlll lib. Phys. Aristot., pp. 153-154.
56. in Metaph. Aristot. 12.6.1.2: "Sed modo videtur quod Aristotles dicat verum.
Ex quo enim motus non est coaeternus Deo, ut ponimus, ergo non semper fuit motor
in actu. Prius igitur erat in potentia transmovens et postea in actu. Ergo mutabatur
ab hac dispositione in illam dispositionem" (ed. Noone, p. 181).
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problem in symbolic terms. 5 7 Suppose we grant that b is the first
mutation or indivisible change. Before that mutation there was some^
thing mutable whose disposition changed prior to b. Let a represent
the change in the disposition of the mutable; b without a (or mutation
without a prior change of disposition) is inconceivable. In reply to
this objection, Rufus denies that a and b are distinct; rather, a and b
are one and the same mutation. The beginning and end of mutations
do not differ; in mutation Ί t is being changed' implies Ί t has been
changed'. Because a is the beginning of fc>, and b is the end of α, and
neither a nor b have parts, a and b are one and the same mutation.
Because a is the same as b, a does not precede ίλ 5 8
Rufus denies that before every mutation (transmutatίo) there occurs
change or motion (motio). Motion is change over time, a successive
process. Mutation refers to instantaneous change, a change where
there is no process, no distinction between the beginning of change
and the completed change or the changed state. Unlike a first motion,
a first mutation is possible because mutation is indivisible. There is
no succession in creation, and hence it follows "α is [being] created,
therefore a exists." In creation "coming to be made" and "having been
made" do not differ.59 Rufus concludes his argument by suggesting that
this is the reply that should have been made to Aristotle's argument
in Physics 8. 6 0
57. His is an early medieval use of what is called the argumentum in terminis; Rufus
is employing a manner of argument he found in Aristotle and Averroes. Compare
Robertus Grosseteste, De veritate propositiorάs and De libero arbitrio 6(7), 8(9), and
9, as in Bauer, Die phibsophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, BGPM 9 (Mϋnster:
Aschendorff, 1912), pp. 143, 170, 191-192, 196).
58. In Metaph. Aristot. 12.6.1.2: "[F]alsum est, quia haec transmutatio et b trans-
mutatio, quae posita est prima, sunt una et eadem transmutatio. Et cum dicit b
transmutatio est finis istius transmutationis, quia initium b transmutationis est finis
alterius transmutationis, dicendum est quod initium b transmutationis et finis b trans-
mutationis sunt unum et idem, quia b transmutatio est mutatio quae non est motus.
Et in tali mutatione sequitur 'mutatur, ergo est mutatum'. Si igitur initium transmuta-
tionis b est finis illius transmutationis, igitur ista transmutatio et b transmutatio sunt
una et eadem transmutatio. Ergo b transmutationem non praecedit alia transmutatio"
(ed. Noone, p. 185).
59. in Metaph. Aristot. 12.6.1.3-4: "Unde sequitur 'a creatur, ergo a est'. In
creatione igitur non difϊert 'fieri' et 'factum esse', sed sequitur 'fit, ergo factum est' in
creatione" (ed. Noone, p. 184).
60. in Metaph. Aristot. 12.6.1.3-4: "Penitus eodem modo respondendum est ad
argumentum Aristotelis quod facit in octavo Physicorum" (ed. Noone, p. 185).
RICHARD RUFUS OF CORNWALL ON CREATION 21
CREATION AND MUTABILITY
Rufus's response to the argument that creation neces^
sarily implies mutability in the creator has undergone a similar de-
velopment. As in the Physics -commentary, Rufus explains God's im-
mutability in terms of the distinction between temporally prior and
prior by nature.61 But Rufus no longer claims that this is because of the
simplicity of God's nature or because God's will remains unchanged.
Rufus abandons this claim on the basis of the following argument:
We could ask: When <God> created the world at the first instant of
time, why didn't he create it before?62 Either he willed to create the
world before or he did not. If he did not, and he now wills to create the
world, then there is a change [diversitas] in his will, and God is mutable.
If God willed to create the world ab aeterno, and his will is his action,
then he created the world ab aeterno.^
Here the objector has posed a dilemma. If the world is not coeternal
with God, it came into existence at a particular point in time, at
which point God's will changed. No one can claim that God's will is
unchanged, and God chooses to act at the first instant of time, since
God's will is identical with God's action. If, on the other hand, God's
will dictated from eternity the creation of the world, why is the world
not coeternal with God?
Rufus's reply to this objection allows that creation involves a
change but denies that any change occurs in the creator. Rufus
begins his reply to the objection by saying that the proposition 'God
creates from eternity' is false. God speaks from eternity, but God
does not create from eternity. Rufus distinguishes between God's
making or creation {facere) and God's speaking (dicere). 'Making'
differs from 'saying' in that it adds something to the object made—
61. In Metaph. Aristot. 12.6.1.3-4: "Uncle cum quaerit 'quare non fίiit mundus
prius etc.,' cum illud prius non sit prius tempore sed natura, et mundus sit in universa
creatura, hoc est quaerere quare non fuit creatura prior natura. Et hoc est quaerere
quare non [est] mundus coaeternus Deo. . . . Et huic respondendum est quod Creator
prior est natura omni creatura" (ed. Noone, pp. 190-192).
62. For a discussion of the "why not sooner" argument see Sorabji, Time, Creation,
and the Continuum, pp. 232-238.
63. in Metaph. Aristot. 12.6.1.4: "Turn hoc potest quaeri: Cum creavit mundum
in primo instanti temporis, quare non creavit ipsum prius? Aut enim voluit creare
ipsum prius aut non. Si non, et modo vult, ergo diversitas voluntatis est in ipso. Ergo
est transmutatio in ipso. Si voluit ab aeterno, et sua voluntas est sua actio, ergo ab
aeterno creavit ipsum" (ed. Noone, p. 182).
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namely, existence.6"* Rufus distinguishes types of predication about
God. Predication about God's essence, absolutely considered, is dis-
tinguished from predication about divine essence as related to external
objects.65 Some predication about divine action is related to external
objects in a way that implies nothing about whether the external
object has material existence. Thus T h e first cause knows something'
implies nothing about whether that thing exists.66 On the other hand,
T h e first cause makes something' and 'God creates something' imply
that the object of the relationship has material existence.6?
'Making' is a special kind of divine 'speaking', a kind which not
only implies existence but which may also describe the time at which
the thing is created. God's speaking always remains in the present
tense, but what God says about the object may be that it has been
or will be created. God is eternally present, but God's speech can
64. In Metaph. Aristot. 12.6.1.3: "Ad aiiud dicendum quod huiusmodi propositiones
sunt falsae: 'prima causa movet ab aeterno' et etiam 'creat ab aeterno' et similiter
'facit hoc ab aeterno'. Haec tamen vera 'dicit ab aeterno'. Et non est suum dicere
suum facere. Nam si sic, cum quaecunque dicit dicit ab aeterno, ergo quaecunque
facit facit ab aeterno, quod falsum est.// Sciendum est igitur quod facere et creare
addunt aliquid supra suum dicere. Ilia tamen additio cadit supra rem dictam ab eo et
non super eum. Verbi gratia, intelligamus modo causam primam [esse in] indivisibili
nunc aeternitatis, et similiter intelligamus omne praedicatum dicibile de ipsa dicί de
ea prout potest dici" (ed. Noone, p. 186).
65. Robert Grosseteste distinguishes what God knows about the divine substance
absolutely and what God knows about divine substance in relation to variable
substances. Knowing is a relation that varies when its terms vary. God's knowledge
of variable substances establishes relations that are eternal but different from God
because they are variable. Since relations have no essence apart from the essence of
their terms, multiplying relations does result in an increase in entities. Grosseteste
argues that he is not committed to postulating many eternal essences; there is only
one eternal and indivisible essence which is God (De libero arbitirio 8[9] [ed. Dales,
pp. 177f., 192, 196]).
66. The distinction between the 'knowing' and such verbs as 'creating' and
'governing' is also found in Grosseteste's De libero arbitrio 8(9) (ed. Dales, p. 1840-
The relation established by knowing is indifferent to the existence or nonexistence of
the thing known. On the other hand, the relation of creation implies the existence
of the thing created. I owe these references to Grosseteste to Neil Lewis.
67. in Metaph. Aristot. 12.6.1.3: "Sciendum est quod, quando de ipsa causa prima
praedicatur sua actio relata ad obiectum extra, et hoc per aliquam relationem dici-
bilem de ipsa. . . illud obiectum est indifferens sive sit actu in materia sive non. Et
respectu alterius relationis quae exit a sua essentia et terminatur in obiectum extra,
oportet quod illud obiectum non sit indifferens sed quod sit in materia extra in actu"
(ed. Noone, pp. 187-188).
RICHARD RUFUS OF CORNWALL ON CREATION 23
indicate what things will exist first, what things will succeed them,
and what things will exist last.6 8
How does this discussion answer the objection? First, God does
not create from eternity; God speaks from eternity. Second, there is
a change, but only in created things. God is eternally present and
unchanging. When viewed from the perspective of created things,
however, God's speaking and creation are not simultaneous. The
world changes, and its changes are measured in a temporal succession
dictated by God's eternal speech.
Rufus takes more seriously in the Metaphysics -commentary the chal-
lenge that Aristotle presents for the Christian account of creation. A
less reliable authority than Rufus had previously thought, Aristotle is
a more formidable philosophical opponent.
THE SENTENCES-COMMENTARY
(C. 1250)
Rufus's Sentences -commentary represents a further stage
in his development as an interpreter of Aristotle. Rufus confidently
presents arguments against the eternity of time and for creation ex
nihilo. He is no longer anxious to dissociate himself from the views ex-
pressed earlier in his Physics -commentary. Rufus once more advances
the argument from the Physics -commentary that time must have a
beginning: "All time before now is past. But. . . there is no past time
which was not present. Therefore, any time which might be past had
[already] been present, and thus the past is finite."69
68. In Metaph. Aristot. 12.6.1.3: Έ t similiter si dicam 'faciet hanc animam,' hoc
est dictu 'dick hanc animam fΐendam esse, et hoc per suum dicere.' Similiter si
dicam 'fecit hanc animam,' hoc est dictu 'dicit hanc animam factam esse, et hoc per
suum dicere.' Et similiter si dicam 'creavit hanc animam,' hoc est dictu 'dicit hanc
animam creatam fuisse, et hoc per suum dicere.' In omnibus his patet quod semper
dicit praesentialiter de prima causa; futuritio et praeteritio cadunt super obiecta ad
quae habent suae actiones relationem" (ed. Noone, pp. 188—189). For a further
discussion of Rufus's views see Noone, pp. 129-133). Noone has also taken up these
issues in his unpublished paper, "Richard Rufus, Franciscan, on Creation and Divine
Immutability," delivered at Kalamazoo, 12 May 1990.
69. Rufus Sent, 2.1: "Sequitur contra aeternitatem motus et temporis aliquid
dicere. Dico ergo quod totum tempus usque nunc, praeteritum est. Sed quidquid est
praeteritum, aliquando fuit praesens; nihil igitur temporis est praeteritum quod non
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THE BEGINNING OF TIME AND MOTION
In the Sentences -commentary, Rufus suggests that the
description of motion found in the Physics -commentary may not be
incompatible with the later Metaphysics -description. He asks: What is
the beginning of motion? Does it have an intrinsic limit, as time has
a first instant? He is not even sure time has a first instant. Perhaps
the limit of time is extrinsic, as he had claimed in the Physics*
commentary. Rufus asks: When we say something begins to move,
don't we mean that now is the last instant that it is at rest?70 Al-
ternatively, as Rufus had maintained in the Metaphysics -commentary,
a mutation is the beginning of motion—namely, the transformation
from not moving to moving, whose beginning and end are one and
the same mutation.
After claiming somewhat implausibly that these replies may amount
to the same thing, Rufus decides in his Sentences -commentary for the
account of the Metaphysics. Motion has a first mutation, an intrinsic
limit, as time has a first instant. Before every motion there is a
mutation. But it is not true to claim, as Aristotle would, that before
every mutation there is motion.71
CREATION EX NIHILO
Though Rufus adopts the Metaphysics -commentary ac-
count, according to which motion has an intrinsic limit, the first
mutation, he no longer uses this account of mutation to reply to
fuit praesens. Ergo praesens fuit antequam aliquid esset praeteritum, et ita praeteritum
finitum est" (Oxford, Balliol College 62, fol. 105rb).
70. Compare Norman Kretzmann, "Incipit/Desinit," in Motion and Time, Space,
and Matter: Interrelations in the History and Philosophy of'Science, ed. Peter K. Machamer
and Robert G. Turnbull (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1976); and Kretz-
mann, "Socrates Is Whiter Than Plato Begins to Be White," Nous 11 (1977): 3-15.
71. Rufus Sent. 2.1: "Praeterea, illud supra tactum, quaeri potest quid sit principium
initiate motus, et an aliquod habeat sui intrinsecum, sicut tempus habet instans
primum.// Nescio an dicam quod ultimum non moveri sit principium motus. Verbi
gratia: Incipit moveri, quid est hoc nisi nunc ultimo non movetur?// Aut aliter (sed
forte in idem redit): Principium sive <(?)> initium motus est mutari, scilicet de non-
moveri ad moveri. Et haec mutatio est subita, quia mutatio medium non habet.//
Unde hoc patere potest, ut videtur, quod contra Aristotelem et alios philosophos:
Omnem motum praecedit aliqua mutatio quae non est motus. Nam mutatum-esse
praecedit motum, non tamen omnem mutationem praecedit vel mutatio vel motus"
(Oxford, Balliol 62, fol. 105ra).
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Aristotle's argument for a beginningless world. Rufus summarizes Aris-
totle's argument for the view that motion and the world could not
begin ex nihilo: Έverything that was not and afterwards is, was po-
tentially'. In the Sentences -commentary Rufus does not present the
solution advanced in the Metaphysics -commentary—namely, in the
case of the creation of the world, The world has been created'
follows from The world is being created'. Instead, in the Sentences -
commentary he starts by invoking an argument from Alexander of
Hales and Robert Grosseteste.72 Any potential realized in creation
is the active potential of the creator acting as an efficient cause.
Implicit here is the claim that there is no material substrate in the
case of creation, unlike generation. This distinction between creation
and generation is found in the works of Alexander of Hales'.73 It is
emphasized by Richard Rufiis in all three commentaries.
The more interesting solution Richard Rufus offers to this problem
is taken almost verbatim from Robert Grosseteste's De finitate.™ It
involves careful distinctions about the meaning of the term 'after'
when used to describe time and eternity. When we say, The first
mutation was, after it was not', we should be precise about the word
'after'. If 'after' signifies a temporal order, then, given that there was
no time before the first motion, the seemingly self-evident division
"Either motion is perpetual or else it is after it was not" is in fact
false, since motion does exist, and is not perpetual, but is also not
temporally ordered 'after' its nonexistence. If, on the other hand, the
72. Alexander of Hales De duratione mundi: "Cum autem obicitur 'primus mo-
tus aut est factus aut est eternus,' dicimus quod factus est. . .sed non per viam
naturae. . . . Nee est in creatis eductio de potentia in actum secundum quod haec
eductio est materialis; potentia enim ilia tune esset potentia materiae sicut est in
natura creata. Aut si fiat in potentia antequam educantur non sunt in potentia
materiae, sed agentis tantum" (Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 15272, fol. 149va, cited in
Dales, Medieval Discussions of the Eternity of the World, p. 70). Robert Grosseteste
De finitate, "verum est quod mundus et tempus et motus fuerunt postquam non
fuerunt; et priusquam essent, fuerunt in potentia. . . et 'potentia* non dicat potentiam
causae materialis sed solum potentiam causae efficientis" (ed. Dales, p. 259). See also
Grossseteste Com. in Vlll lib. Phys. Aristot. 8 (ed. Dales, p. 150).
73. Alexander of Hales De duratione mundi, in Dales, Medieval Discussions, p. 70.
Doubtless this distinction is found in many other authors.
74. Richard C. Dales quotes Grosseteste in the recent book Medieval Discussions,
p. 73. Dales also notes Rufus's borrowing from Grosseteste (p. 79). The text as a
whole is available in Dales's editions: De finitate, pp. 258-260; Com. in Vlll lib. Phys.
Aήstot. 8, pp. 149-51.
26 REGA WOOD
word 'after' signifies the relation of time to eternity, then if the word
'is' signifies time or an instant, and the word 'was' signifies eternity, it
is true that time, motion, and the world exist after they did not exist.
Time and motion even existed potentially, provided we realize that
the only potential that existed was the active potential of the creator
and not any potential material cause. But this exposition of the term
'after' is forced. It would be appropriate if before time and the world
began, there was time without beginning. But eternity is not the same
as beginningless time; eternity is not temporally prior to the time the
world began. So no potential world existed before creation.
The dictum 'Everything that was not and afterwards is, was poten-
tially' is true, but its scope is limited. It applies only in cases where
temporal priority makes sense, where both being and nonbeing are
in time.75
Rufus's final tactic for defending ex nihilo creation involves an
elaborate discussion of the word 'nothing'. As usual, Rufus's statement
of the problem is pointed: "What is that nonbeing which is prior to
being, and how is it prior if not in virtue of eternity?" Strictly speaking,
75. Rufus Sent. 2.1: "Et ad istud dici potest quod ilia propositio falsa est: Omne
quod est postquam non fuit, prius fuit in potentia nisi intelligatur de potentia activa
creatoris. Potest et aliter dici quod cum dicitur prima mutatio fuit postquam non
fuit, distinguendum est quod si haec dictio 'postquam' significet ordinem temporum
<(!) B>, implicata est in hoc <h B> sermone contradictio, quia implicatur quod
tempus praecessit primum motum. Et tune non est haec divisio sufficiens: Motus aut
est perpetuus, aut fuit postquam non fuit, quia sub neutra parte huius divisionis cadit
motus, nee tempus, nee mundus.// Si autem haec dictio 'postquam' significet ordinem
temporis ad aeternΐtatem, et hoc verbum 'est' consignificet tempus vel nunc temporis,
et hoc verbum 'fuit' consignificet aeternitatem, verum est quod mundus et tempus et
motus est postquam non fuit. Et priusquam essent, fuerunt in potentia, si designetur
prioritas aeternitatis ad tempus, et potentia non dicat potentiam causae materialis
sed causae efficientis.// Ilia autem propositio Όmne quod de potentia priore exit ad
actum' etc., vera est si significetur prioritas temporalis, et sic tenet eius probatio. Si
autem significetur prioritas aeternorum ad temporalia, falsa est.// Item, ilia ratio quod
non esse mundi et eius esse dividuntur prioritate et posterioritate, et prius et posterius
non sunt simul tempore, ergo ante mundum fuit tempus—In hoc sicut supra dictum
est, puto quod sit error in eo quod non distinguitur inter prioritatem temporis et
prioritatem quae significat ordinem aeternitatis ad tempus. Non-esse namque mundi
et eorum quae cum mundo ceperunt non mensuravit tempus sine initio sed aeternitas.
Non ergo fuit eorum non-esse prius tempore quam esse eorum. Sed fuit prius et in
priori mensura quam eorum esse, quia eorum non-esse in aeternitate fiiίt, et earum
esse in tempore" (Oxford, Balliol 62, fol. 105ra).
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Rufus offers no reply. He tells us he is not sure that nonbeing is noth-
ing. Perhaps it is an abuse of language to say that either nothing or
nonbeing is prior to something or being. Or perhaps, loosely speaking,
we might be allowed to say that nothing and nonbeing are prior by
origin to something or being. But since being and nonbeing are never
measured simultaneously, perhaps one cannot be prior to the other.76
It may be that the only correct statement about the creation of the
world is that 'it is, and it was not'.7 7 Clearly, Rufus's scruple here
has to do with the incommensurability of being and nonbeing. But
he may also be concerned to avoid the possibility of anything even
remotely resembling empty time, before the existence of the world.
MUTABILITY AND CREATION
In his discussion of mutability and creation, Rufus sets
out to refute Aristotle by demonstrating that absurd conclusions
76. Rufus Sent. 2.1: "Quid ergo illud non-esse prius est quam istud esse, quomodo
ergo prius si non aeternitate prius? Ecce aliquid fit ex nihilo, id est post. Ergo aliquid
est post nihil, ergo nihil est prius illo aliquo, quomodo prius? Nescio an dicam quod
illud non-esse, nihil est. Unde nee ipsum, nee nihil proprie loquendo prius est quam
esse vel aliquid, et abusive solum dicitur illud prius, et hoc posterius.// An dicam
quod sic improprie loquendo, nihil et non-esse quodammodo quasi origine prius sit
quam aliquid et esse, et e converso aliquid et esse [sit] origine posterius quam nihil
et non-esse.// Forte melius ad hoc dicetur sic: Mensuretur aeternitate illud non-esse.
Mensuretur, id est contineatur. Subici enim scientiae Dei est contineri [vel] mensurari
ab ipso Deo. Mensuretur et istud esse aeternitate <et add. B?>. Illud mensurabatur
aeternitate quando ipsum fuit et istud mensuratur aeternitate quando ipsum est. Sed
quando istud est, illud non est, nee quando illud fuit, istud fuit. Ergo sicut non
simul sunt, sed unum alteri succedit, nee simul mensurantur aeternitate. Sed illud
prius mensurabatur, et istud posterius mensuratur. Nee illud est aeternitate prius isto,
quia non ambo simul sub aeternitate ordinantur. Nee istud est aeternitate posterius
illo eadem ratione. Sed illud fuit prius mensuratum aeternitate quam istud. Et etiam
illud aliquo modo dicendi origine prius est quam istud, et istud posterius origine.// Et
similiter dicendum est de partibus temporis diversis.// Quid ergo proprie dici potest
cum creatur nisi quod a est et non fuit α. Sic nulla erit improprietas in verbis"
(Oxford, Balliol 62, fol. 105vb).
77. Allen W. Wood has suggested that Grosseteste and Rufus may not even be
entitled to this formulation. Having given up the use of the terms 'before' and 'after'
in the strict sense, they must give up the verb 'was' which cannot be expounded
without the use of the term 'before.' A similar difficulty arises with respect to the
term 'begin.'
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follow from his views on the First Cause. As in the Metaphysics -
commentary, Rufus sees Aristotle as claiming that the world is eternal
and that God causes it, not a common position in Rufus's time.?8
But there is a difference. In the giving accounts of the Physics and
Metaphysics, Rufus had restricted himself to defending the Christian
view that creation need not imply mutability in the creator. In the
Sentences -commentary, Rufus takes the offensive; he seeks to show
that unless Aristotle accepts the view that the world was created
ex nihilo, he is committed to maintaining the absurd conclusion that
God, or the First Cause, is mutable. Rufus seeks to show that Aristotle
cannot consistently maintain both that the world is eternal and that
God causes it:
If God made the world, either it was made from something or from
nothing. If it is made from nothing, then the world was nothing, and
afterwards it had being; therefore in no sense is it eternal. Rather it has
a beginning; it has being after nonbeing. . . .
If God made the world from something, then either it was made from God
himself or from another nature. It cannot have been made from another
nature, since there was no other nature. Therefore it must have been
made from God. From this it follows that God is mutable and composite,
and the world is of the same nature as God. For whenever something
is made from anything, something is necessarily common to both. So if
God made the world from God, God communicates something of God to
the world, from which God fabricates the substance of the world. There
is also something which God does not communicate to the world, and
hence God is composite.79
78. Noone has pointed out that in this period this is a distinctive aspect of Rufus's
interpretation of Aristotle ("An Edition," p. 28). But note that William of Auvergne,
like Rufus, sees Aristotle as claiming that the world is eternal, and God causes it (De
universo 1.2.8 [Paris ed. 1:690-692]).
79. Rufus Sent. 2.1: "Item, contra ilium errorem qui ponit mundum Deo coaeter*
num, et tamen a Deo factum, opponitur sic: Si Deus fecit ilium, aut ergo de aliquo,
aut de nihilo. Si de nihilo, ergo mundus nihil fuit, et postea esse habuit, ergo nullo
modo aeternus, sed initium habens, et esse post non esse.// Si de aliquo, aut de se Deo,
aut de alia natura. Non de alia, quia nulla fuit alia, ergo de se Deo. Ex quo sequitur
quod ipse Deus transmutabilis est et compositus, et quod mundus sit eiusdem naturae
cum Deo.// Nam quando aliquid fit de aliquo, necesse est aliquid esse commune
in utroque. /105va/. . .Si ergo Deus facit mundum de se Deo, aliquam partem sui
mundo communicat, ex qua fabricat substantiam mundi et aliquid aliud mundo non
communicat, et ita esset Deus compositus" (Oxford, Balliol 62, fol. 105rb-105va).
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Here the conclusion—namely, that the substance of the First Cause is
mutable and composite—would be as unpalatable to an Aristotelian as
to a Christian theologian. Given the thorny problems Aristotle has set
for the Christian account of creation, Rufus must have been pleased
to have found an argument that seemed to show that unless Aristotle
accepted ex nϊhilo creation, he must either give up the view that God
causes the world, or else accept the view that God is mutable.
What will Rufus come up with next? I have not examined in
detail Rufus's last work, the Paris commentary. But I note that Rufus
repeats several of the arguments against the eternity of the world
found originally in the Physics -commentary.80 From the Sentences-
commentary, Rufus takes the argument that the First Cause must be
mutable if the world was not created ex nihilo; an immutable God
cannot make the world from eternity.81 Further examination would
undoubtedly reveal exciting new arguments. Richard Rufus will not
limit himself to repeating some of his own earlier arguments and
adding to the discussion from Bonaventure's Sentences -commentary.
Instead Rufus will take the dialogue with Aristotle a step further.
The exciting thing about Richard Rufus is how many interesting
views he presented, apparently for the first time. He did not culti-
vate originality; he borrowed without hesitation from Alexander of
Hales, Robert Grosseteste, and Bonaventure. Nevertheless, Rufίis's
own philosophical creativity was exceptional; he anticipated many of
the classic Western replies to Aristotle on the eternity of the world.
Rufus was one of the first scholastic philosophers to face the conflict
between Aristotle and the revealed doctrine of creation. For over a
century after he wrote, Christian philosophers continued to explore
80. Rufus Abbreviatio Bonav. 2.1.1: "Si infiniti homines praecessissent. . . . Item,
totum tempus usque nunc praeteritum est. . . . Item, impossibile est infinita ordi-
n a r i . . . . Item, impossibile est infinita comprehendi... . Item, si mundus est aeter-
nus cum nunquam fuit sine h o m i n e . . . . " (Vatican, Vat. lat. 12993, fol.
132va-vb).
81. Rufus Abbreviatio Bonav. 2.1.1: "Item contra illos duos modos ponendi mundum
Deo coaeternum, et tamen factum opponitur sic: 'Si Deus fecit mundum, aut ergo de
aliquo aut de nihilo. Si de nihilo, ergo habet esse post non esse, ergo non est aeternus.
Si de aliquo, aut ergo de se Deo, aut de alia natura. Non de alia, quia nulla sint alia.
Ergo de Deo, ergo Deus est transmutabilis, mutabilis, corruptibilis, compositus etc. Et
mundus eiusdem naturae est cum Deo, quae omnia absurda sunt'" (Vatican, Vat. lat.
12993, fol. 133ra).
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these issues from a variety of standpoints and at a high level of
sophistication. They engaged the best minds of the high Middle
Ages, including Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and William of
Ockham. It is perhaps surprising, therefore, and certainly impressive,
that Richard Rufus's treatment of these topics, clearly one of the
earliest, already exhibits a subtlety and complexity comparable to the
best of what was to follow.
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